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THE PROOF DID NOT SUPPORT SURROGATE’S COURT’S FINDING THAT THERE WAS A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESPONDENTS AND THE DECEDENT AND THE PROOF DID NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS EXERTED UNDUE INFLUENCE UPON DECEDENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the evidence did not support the finding that the respondents, decedent’s daughter Ellen and her son, Alex, exerted undue influence upon the decedent. In addition, the proof did not support the finding of a confidential relationship between respondents and the decedent:

Here, although the record establishes that Ellen and Alexander held a position of trust with decedent, and that Ellen assisted decedent with her finances and was named decedent’s power of attorney, the record also reflects that, despite Ellen’s position of trust, decedent was actively and personally involved in managing her real estate and in drafting her estate plan, and that she directed her personal attorney and the branch manager at her bank to act according to her own desires based on her own personal, stated reasons. …

Here, the record reflects that Ellen and Alexander wanted to benefit from decedent’s estate, and that Ellen assisted decedent in executing the relevant estate plan and making the disputed transactions. The relevant inquiry, however, is not what Ellen and Alexander may have wanted, asked for, or facilitated, but rather whether decedent’s free will, independent action, and self-agency were overcome by their conduct … . In this case, the record establishes that decedent informed her attorney in 2011 that she did not want petitioner to have any further power over her affairs, that decedent thereafter worked with her attorney directly in order to revise her estate plan, and that decedent discussed with her attorney her personal reasons for altering her prior estate plan to the exclusion of petitioner. Indeed, decedent’s attorney testified that he never prepared a document that decedent did not personally authorize, and testimony from numerous non-beneficiaries established decedent’s capacity and active management of her own affairs during the relevant time frame, albeit with the assistance of Ellen. Simply put, the record does not reflect that decedent at any time lost her free will or agency, and instead the record reflects that she took the disputed actions based on her stated personal motives. Matter of Kotsones, 2020 NY Slip Op 04102, Fourth Dept 7-17-20

 

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