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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS ARCHITECTURAL MALPRACTICE/BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact about whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations in this architectural malpractice/breach of contract action. Defendant’s decedent was hired by plaintiff to construct a four-story condominium. Although the work was completed in 2008 there were problems getting approval by the city and new architectural services contracts were entered in 2015 and 2018. The court noted that, where a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 is made on statute-of-limitations grounds, a plaintiff may remedy any defects in the pleadings in an affidavit:

“[A]n action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” is subject to a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[6] … ). Such an action, founded upon “defective design or construction accrues upon the actual completion of the work to be performed and the consequent termination of the professional relationship” … . However, “a professional malpractice cause of action asserted against an architect or engineer may be tolled under the continuous representation’ doctrine if the plaintiff shows its reliance upon a continued course of services related to the original professional services provided” … . * * *

Even if the defendant had met her prima facie burden, the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation toll applied. Specifically, the plaintiff averred in an affidavit in opposition to the motion that [defendant’s decedent] continued to work on the project from 2008 through the time that the parties entered into the 2015 agreement, including by continuing to revise the plans so as to subdivide the property, regularly meeting with the plaintiff, renewing building permits with the plaintiff, meeting with a “commissioner” at the DOB [NYC Department of Buildings] to discuss revised plans, and filing an application concerning the project with the DOB in 2014. Anderson v Pinn, 2020 NY Slip Op 03636, Second Dept 7-1-20

 

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