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PLAINTIFF’S DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER THE STATE AND CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATE VERSUS CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN THIS CONTEXT EXPLAINED IN SOME DEPTH (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, determined plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims under the NYS and NYC Human Rights Law (HRL) properly survived summary judgment. Issues of fact were raised about whether defendant sufficiently engaged in dialogue about accommodating plaintiff’s needs prior to terminating her employment. The decision explains the different proof requirement for disability discrimination and accommodation under the NYSHML and the NYCHML, noting that the NYCHML imposes a heavier burden on the employer than the NYSHRL:

Under both the State and City HRLs, “the first step in providing a reasonable accommodation is to engage in a good faith interactive process that assesses the needs of the disabled individual and the reasonableness of the accommodation requested. The interactive process continues until, if possible, an accommodation reasonable to the employee and employer is reached” … . * * *

Unlike the State HRL where the employer must “engage[] in interactions with the employee revealing at least some deliberation upon the viability of” an accommodation … , the City HRL clearly requires a more rigorous process … . Indeed, to emphasize the seriousness by which employers must engage in the interactive process, the City Council amended the City HRL in 2018 … . The Committee Report … states: “This bill would clarify the reasonable accommodation requirement by expressly requiring, as a part of the reasonable accommodation process, that covered entities engage in a cooperative dialog with individuals who they know or should know may require accommodation.” * * *

Here, defendant cannot prevail in its summary judgment motion seeking to dismiss plaintiff’s State HRL disability claim because there are issues of fact as to whether defendant engaged plaintiff in a good faith interactive process to ascertain the viability of an appropriate accommodation. * * *

Given that the City HRL is even broader than the State HRL … , defendant has likewise failed to show that it engaged in an interactive process with plaintiff. Hosking v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 2020 NY Slip Op 03484, First Dept 6-18-20

 

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