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DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL ARGUED DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT WAS NOT VIABLE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, remitting the matter for a determination of defendant’s CPL 330.30 motion to set aside the verdict, determined defendant’s attorney took a position adverse to defendant by arguing defendant’s pro se motion was not viable:

Prior to sentencing, the defendant moved, pro se, to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPL 330.30. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that the defendant asked him to adopt the motion but that defense counsel did not believe that it was “viable.” He added that, in his opinion, the motion argued matters that were not “for the purview of the [c]ourt.” The Supreme Court declined to review the motion.

As the People concede, defense counsel, by taking a position adverse to that of his client on the motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPL 330.30, deprived the defendant of the effective assistance of counsel … . People v Sonds, 2020 NY Slip Op 03036, Second Dept 5-27-20

 

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