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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, TERMINATED THE GUARDIANSHIP OF AN INCAPACITATED PERSON WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, terminated the guardianship of an incapacitated person (IP) without holding a hearing:

In April 2016, Fanny K. commenced this proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 81 seeking to be appointed as the guardian to manage Angeliki K.’s property located in Greece. After a hearing, the Supreme Court determined that Angeliki K. (hereinafter the IP) was incapacitated within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law article 81 and appointed Fanny K. (hereinafter the guardian) as the guardian of her property. In September 2018, due to the IP’s health problems and resultant inability to communicate in English, the IP was admitted to an assisted living and rehabilitation facility in Athens, Greece. In November 2018, the guardian moved for leave to change the IP’s place of abode from New York to the assisted living and rehabilitation facility, with the IP continuing to maintain her permanent residence in New York. The court, without a hearing, denied the motion and, sua sponte, terminated the guardianship due to a lack of a continuing nexus between the guardianship and New York.

The Supreme Court should not have, sua sponte, terminated the guardianship, without a hearing, as a guardianship may be terminated “only on application of a guardian, the incapacitated person, or any other person entitled to commence a proceeding under Mental Hygiene Law article 81 with a hearing on notice” (… see Mental Hygiene Law §§ 81.36[b], [c] …). Matter of Angeliki K. (Fanny K.), 2020 NY Slip Op 02786, Second Dept 5-13-20

 

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