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THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO THE GRAND JURY IN THIS DRUNK-DRIVING-ACCIDENT CASE SUPPORTED THE TWO COUNTS OF DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE ASSAULT STEMMING FROM INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE TWO PASSENGERS; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THOSE COUNTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the evidence submitted to the Grand Jury supported the depraved indifference assault counts stemming from injuries suffered by the two passenger in a drunk driving accident after a police pursuit:

The … accident reconstruction revealed that defendant was driving 119 miles an hour five seconds before the accident, then slammed on his brakes and steered hard to the right, hurtling into the parking lot and striking a concrete barrier at approximately 60 miles per hour. * * *

Drunk driving cases do not ordinarily lend themselves to a finding of depraved indifference, nor does “every vehicular police chase resulting in death [or serious injury] . . . take place under circumstances evincing” it … . Unlike in cases where a defendant attempted to avoid harming others in the course of a chase … , however, the intoxicated defendant here was warned by one of his passengers that he should slow down and “was well aware that [he] was endangering [their] lives” by flouting traffic laws and fleeing a police officer at ludicrous speeds on local roads … . Moreover, the same passenger testified that defendant knew that the parking lot was a shortcut to another street and that he suddenly “turned into” it when she mentioned seeing a police cruiser. The grand jury could infer from this proof that defendant did not care about the welfare of his passengers and that he lost control of the vehicle not in an unsuccessful effort to navigate a bend in the road, but rather in a near-suicidal gambit to escape police by making an abrupt turn at high speed and trying to traverse the parking lot. It follows from those inferences that defendant “appreciated that he . . . was engaging in conduct that presented a grave risk of death and totally disregarded that risk, with catastrophic consequences” … . Although innocent inferences could also be drawn from the evidence presented, legally sufficient proof nevertheless existed for the grand jury’s finding that defendant exhibited depraved indifference toward his passengers and, thus, Supreme Court erred in dismissing the two counts of assault in the first degree … . People v Edwards, 2020 NY Slip Op 02503, Third Dept 4-30-20

 

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