You are here: / / CPL 300.40 (3) (b), WHICH REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS,...

CPL 300.40 (3) (b), WHICH REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS, APPLIES ONLY TO VERDICTS AFTER TRIAL, NOT TO GUILTY PLEAS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that Criminal Procedure Law 300.40 (3) (b), which requires dismissal of inclusory concurrent counts, applies only to verdicts after trial and not to cases resolved by guilty plea. Defendant confessed to killing a mother and daughter and he was charged with two counts of first degree murder and two counts of second degree murder. He pled guilty to the two counts of second degree murder. On appeal defendant argued the second degree murder counts should have been dismissed as inclusory concurrent counts of first degree murder:

CPL 300.40 (3) (b) provides, with respect to inclusory concurrent counts, that “[a] verdict of guilty upon the greatest count submitted is deemed a dismissal of every lesser count submitted” … . Even assuming, without deciding, that counts 3 and 4 of the indictment indeed are inclusory concurrent counts of counts 1 and 2, defendant’s reliance upon both the statute and the cases applying it … is misplaced, as CPL article 300 “‘deals only with trials, and has no application to convictions obtained on a plea of guilty'” … . Having elected to plead guilty to the entire indictment, as was defendant’s right (see CPL 220.10 [2]), he cannot now avail himself of the provisions of CPL 300.40 (3) (b) … . People v Redden, 2020 NY Slip Op 02502, Third Dept 4-30-20

 

You might also like
Improper Evidence of Uncharged Offenses, a Police Officer’s Vouching for the Reliability and Credibility of the People’s Central Witness, and the Court’s Failure to Give Limiting Instructions to the Jurors after Sustaining Objections to Improper Testimony Deprived Defendant of a Fair Trial
THE CANDIDATE SIGNED THE SUBSCRIBING WITNESS STATEMENT WHICH INDICATED EACH VOTER SIGNED THE DESIGNATING PETITION IN HIS PRESENCE, WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE, DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PROPERLY INVALIDATED BASED UPON THE CANDIDATE’S PARTICIPATION IN FRAUDULENT ACTIVITY (THIRD DEPT).
THE HEARSAY MISBEHAVIOR REPORT, UNSUPPORTED BY ANY INVESTIGATION, DID NOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER’S GUILT; DETERMINATION ANNULLED (THIRD DEPT). ​
THE LEGISLATURE PROPERLY EMPOWERED THE COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TO RECOMMEND LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH SALARY INCREASES AND THE COMMITTEE DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY (THIRD DEPT).
Negligent Highway Design Not Demonstrated/Plaintiff’s Amnesia Did Not Excuse Submission of Proof of Proximate Cause
Elements of Conversion, Moneys Had and Received and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Causes of Action Described/Equitable Estoppel Did Not Apply to Toll Applicable Statutes of Limitations
THE CHILD IN THIS CUSTODY MATTER RESIDED IN ITALY, THEREFORE NEW YORK WAS NOT THE CHILD’S “HOME STATE” AND NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION; FATHER’S APPLICATION FOR SUBSTITUTE SERVICE IN ITALY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).
THE SANCTION THAT PETITIONER BE CONFINED TO A SPECIAL HOUSING UNIT (SHU), NOW KNOWN AS SEGRETATED CONFINEMENT, FOR 730 DAYS VIOLATED THE HUMANE ALTERNATIVES TO LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ACT (HALT ACT); THE CORRECTION LAW LIMITS SUCH CONFINEMENT TO 15 CONSECUTIVE DAYS (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

EXTRINSIC COLLATERAL DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO IMPEACH... THE PARTIES DID NOT AGREE THAT THE INITIAL ‘PARTIAL’ ARBITRATION...