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You are here: Home1 / Attorneys2 / MISTRIAL BASED UPON DEFENSE COUNSEL’S CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WAS PROPERLY...
Attorneys, Criminal Law

MISTRIAL BASED UPON DEFENSE COUNSEL’S CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WAS PROPERLY GRANTED WITH DEFENDANT’S CONSENT; DOUBLE JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the mistrial, based upon defense counsel’s conflicts of interest (representation of prosecution witnesses) was properly granted with defendant’s consent. Therefore double jeopardy did not attach:

Upon learning of defense counsel’s potential conflicts of interest, County Court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with the parties, during which they explored — to no avail — ways to avoid the conflict, including the possibility of the Special Prosecutor foregoing testimony from the witnesses. The court explained the ramifications of the conflict to defendant more than once, emphasizing that defense counsel’s ethical obligations to his prior clients — the intended prosecution witnesses — could “impact his ability to cross-examine them as vigorously or as effectively or as thoroughly as he otherwise would.” Following this explanation, County Court presented defendant with the choice to waive any conflict and proceed with his assigned counsel or request the assignment of new counsel, thereby necessitating a mistrial and a retrial. Although defendant asserted that he did not “want to do this again,” he also expressed discomfort with being at a disadvantage should his assigned counsel be unable to fully cross-examine either of the prosecution witnesses and ultimately stated, “I’d like to seek new counsel, I guess.” Later, in response to County Court’s additional queries, defendant confirmed that he wanted a new attorney and reasserted his unwillingness to waive any potential conflict of interest. Thereafter, County Court asked if there was an application for a mistrial, to which defendant — through his assigned counsel — stated that there was. … Upon our review of the entire colloquy, we find that defendant requested and, thus, consented to a mistrial … . Inasmuch as the record wholly belies defendant’s further contention that County Court and/or the Special Prosecutor deliberately engaged in misconduct intended to provoke a mistrial, defendant’s retrial was not barred by double jeopardy protections … . People v Ellis, 2020 NY Slip Op 02292, Third Dept 4-16-20

 

April 16, 2020
Tags: Third Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-04-16 14:04:062020-04-18 16:38:58MISTRIAL BASED UPON DEFENSE COUNSEL’S CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WAS PROPERLY GRANTED WITH DEFENDANT’S CONSENT; DOUBLE JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH (THIRD DEPT).
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SHORTLY BEFORE TRIAL, THE PEOPLE WERE PROPERLY ALLOWED TO AMEND THE REFERENCE... FATHER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT TOOK SIX MONTHS TO HOLD A POST-DISPOSITIONAL...
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