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FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO COMPLY WITH THE ‘CULTURAL NORMS’ OF HASIDIC JUDAISM WHEN THE CHILDREN STAY WITH HIM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined father should not have been directed to comply with the “cultural norms” of Hasidic Judaism when the children stay with him:

We agree with the father that, by directing him to comply with the “cultural norms” of Hasidic Judaism during his periods of parental access, the Supreme Court ran afoul of constitutional limitations by compelling the father to himself practice a religion, rather than merely directing him to provide the children with a religious upbringing (see Cohen v Cohen, 177 AD3d at 852; Weisberger v Weisberger, 154 AD3d at 53). While the court referred to the “cultural norms” by which the children were raised, the testimony at the hearing made clear that the “cultural norms” referenced were that each parent would comply with the religious requirements of Hasidic Judaism. Under this Court’s decisions in Weisberger and on the prior appeal, the court’s directive that the father himself comply with these religious practices was an unconstitutional modification of the religious upbringing provision in the judgment of divorce, which must be reversed … . Cohen v Cohen, 2020 NY Slip Op 02263, First Dept 4-9-20

 

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