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THE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AND DEFAMATION CAUSES OF ACTION WERE NOT REFUTED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND WERE ADEQUATELY PLED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff had stated causes of action for tortious interference with contract and defamation and the actions should not have been dismissed on either the “documentary evidence” or “failure to state a cause of action” ground:

Turning first to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), a motion to dismiss pursuant to this provision “will be granted only if the documentary evidence resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively disposes of the plaintiff’s claim” … . What may be deemed “documentary evidence” for purposes of this subsection is quite limited. “Materials that clearly qualify as documentary evidence include documents . . . such as mortgages, deed[s], contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable” … . Here, Supreme Court relied upon the statements taken during defendant’s investigation, as well as its non-harassment policy. As plaintiff argues, even sworn affidavits have been held inadequate to meet this statutory standard, and defendant’s submissions here do not qualify as documentary evidence … . …

The grounds for dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) are also strictly limited; the court is not allowed to render a determination upon a thorough review of the relevant facts adduced by both parties, but rather is substantially more constrained in its review, examining only the plaintiff’s pleadings and affidavits … . …

To establish a claim for tortious interference with a contract, the plaintiff must allege “the existence of [his or her] valid contract with a third party, [the] defendant’s knowledge of that contract, [the] defendant’s intentional and improper procuring of a breach, and damages” … . Here, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that a valid contract existed between plaintiff and the distributor, that defendant intentionally spread “false, specious and salacious accusations against [p]laintiff,” and that such conduct “had no good faith or justifiable cause” and did not “protect an economic interest.” Liberally construing these allegations, as we must, taking all of the alleged facts as true, and giving plaintiff every favorable inference … , they do not fail to state a claim.

The defamation claim will ultimately require “proof that the defendant made ‘a false statement, published that statement to a third party without privilege, with fault measured by at least a negligence standard, and the statement caused special damages or constituted defamation per se'” … . Here, the complaint sets forth the particular words complained of and the damages plaintiff allegedly sustained … . Carr v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 02141, Third Dept 4-2-20

 

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