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CORNELL DID NOT HAVE TO FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES IN ITS STUDENT CODE TO REFUSE ADMISSION TO PETITIONER WHO OMITTED FROM HIS APPLICATION THE FACT HE HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM ANOTHER COLLEGE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined respondent Cornell did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it refused to enroll petitioner because petitioner did not reveal he had been expelled from Kansas State for violations of its code of conduct. Petitioner argued Cornell did not follow the provisions in its Code when it refused to enroll petitioner. But the Third Department held the Code applied only to “students” and not to those who were filling out an application for admission:

In reviewing a determination rendered by a private educational institution where no hearing is required, a court will not disturb it “unless a school acts arbitrarily and not in the exercise of its honest discretion, it fails to abide by its own rules or imposes a penalty so excessive that it shocks one’s sense of fairness” … . Petitioner argues that respondent was obliged to follow the provisions of the Code, which establishes standards of conduct for, as is relevant here, its students. A student is defined under the Code as a person “currently registered” with respondent in one of its divisions or as a special student, “currently enrolled in or taking classes” with respondent, “currently using” respondent’s facilities or property for academic purposes or “currently on leave of absence or under suspension from being a student.” Inasmuch as petitioner was none of those things when he misrepresented his academic background on an application for admission to respondent, neither the Code nor the procedures created by it were applicable to his misconduct, and Supreme Court erred in concluding that they were … . Matter of Kamila v Cornell Univ., 2020 NY Slip Op 02150, Third Dept 4-2-20

 

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