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You are here: Home1 / Appeals2 / CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE CONVICTION ARISING FROM A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT...
Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE CONVICTION ARISING FROM A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, over a two-justice dissent, determined the conviction for criminally negligence homicide was against the weight of the evidence. The passenger in defendant’s car was killed when defendant’s car went off the road, apparently after colliding with other cars defendant was attempting to pass. The decision described all of the witness’s testimony in detail and concluded the conflicting testimony was not a sufficient basis for a conviction:

“A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he [or she] causes the death of another person” (Penal Law § 125.10). A person acts with criminal negligence when “he [or she] fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such [a] circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation” (Penal Law § 15.05[4]).

The defendant’s conduct must rise to a level of carelessness where its “seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community’s . . . sense of right and wrong” … . Moreover, the conduct must create the risk, rather than simply not perceive the risk … .

In cases concerning charges of criminally negligent homicide arising out of automobile accidents involving excess rates of speed, “it takes some additional affirmative act by the defendant to transform speeding into dangerous speeding” … .

Here, the People failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant “fail[ed] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk” (Penal Law § 15.05[4]) which caused the death of his passenger. People v Derival, 2020 NY Slip Op 02072, Second Dept 3-25-20

 

March 25, 2020
Tags: Second Department
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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, APPOINTED A RECEIVER BECAUSE THAT RELIEF... DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS AN OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD...
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