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PLAINTIFF WAS RIDING HER BICYCLE ON A SIDEWALK WHEN SHE COLLIDED WITH DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE AS DEFENDANT WAS ATTEMPTING TO PULL OUT OF A PARKING LOT; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this bicycle-vehicle collision case should not have been granted. Apparently plaintiff was riding on the sidewalk and collided with defendant’s vehicle as it was attempting to pull out of a parking lot:

The plaintiff Jamie Heaney (hereinafter the plaintiff) alleges she was operating a bicycle on a sidewalk when she collided with the defendant’s vehicle, which was attempting to exit from a parking lot … .

“A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident” … . “There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident” … , and the issue of proximate cause is generally one for the jury … . Here, the defendant’s vehicle had pulled out from a parking lot and came to a stop immediately prior to the impact. The defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the presence of his vehicle on the sidewalk merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event but was not one of its causes … . Heaney v Kahn, 2020 NY Slip Op 01333, Second Dept 2-26-20

 

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