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ORDERS ISSUED WHEN THE STAY PURSUANT TO CPLR 321(c) WAS IN EFFECT, DUE TO THE INABILITY OF PETITIONER’S COUNSEL TO CONTINUE FOR MEDICAL REASONS, SHOULD HAVE BEEN VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Scheinkman, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined that orders issued when a stay was in effect pursuant to CPLR 321(c), due to the inability of petitioner’s counsel to continue for medical reasons, should have been vacated. The petitioner is Oleg Cassini’s (the fashion designer’s) wife and the underlying matter is the heavily litigated (to say the least) administration of his estate. The opinion is overwhelming in its detail and cannot be fairly summarized here:

On these appeals, we consider the interplay between CPLR 321(b)(2), which permits the attorney of record for a party to withdraw by order of the court, with the court having the ability to stay proceedings pending substitution of new counsel, and CPLR 321(c), which automatically and effectively suspends all proceedings against a party whose attorney becomes incapacitated until 30 days after notice to appoint another attorney has been served upon that party. In this contentious, complex estate litigation, the Surrogate’s Court determined, in the context of a motion by the attorneys for the petitioner to withdraw from representing her, that the attorney primarily responsible for the matter had become unable to continue to represent the petitioner due to health reasons. While the Surrogate’s Court relieved counsel and provided for a 30-day stay of proceedings, it failed to require that the adverse parties serve the orders relieving counsel upon the litigant whose counsel was permitted to withdraw. The adverse parties themselves failed to serve the orders and also to serve the petitioner with a notice to appoint new counsel. However, several months later, the petitioner appeared with prospective new counsel at a court conference and was advised by the court that a trial would be conducted some six weeks later, regardless of whether the petitioner was present and regardless of whether the petitioner had representation. This was, under the circumstances, the practical equivalent of more than 30 days’ notice to the litigant to appoint new counsel. In conformity with the controlling statutory and decisional authorities, and to protect the litigant’s right to legal representation, we conclude that the judicial determinations rendered in between the Surrogate’s Court determination of incapacity and its subsequent practical notification of a deadline to appoint counsel should be vacated. Matter of Cassini, 2020 NY Slip Op 01057, Second Dept 2-13-2o

 

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