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DEFENDANT CONSTRUCTION MANAGER WAS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S INJURY PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW 240 (1); THE ARTICULATING LIFT USED BY PLAINTIFF WAS A SAFETY DEVICE WHICH FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT AGAINST AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant which entered a construction management agreement with the Port Authority was a statutory agent of the Port Authority and was liable for plaintiff’s injury pursuant to Labor Law 240 (1). Plaintiff was injured when he lost control of an articulating lift when backing down a ramp:

Plaintiffs demonstrated that defendants can be held liable as a statutory “agent” of the Port Authority based on the contract documents that they submitted on the motion. Those documents impose not only the responsibility to coordinate the work but also a broad responsibility for “overall job site safety,” including the implementation of the Port Authority’s Safety Health and Environmental Program, as well as measures to ensure worker safety, thereby granting the construction manager “the ability to control the activity which brought about the injury” … .

Moreover, plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. As the motion court found, plaintiff’s testimony established prima facie that the articulating lift was a safety device and that it’s failure to protect him from the elevation-related risk that he faced was the proximate cause of his injury. Lind v Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y., 2020 NY Slip Op 01026, First Dept 2-13-20

 

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