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TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT AND DEFAMATION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED; ELEMENTS EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff stated causes of action for tortious interference with employment and defamation against a fellow employee of the Central New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (CNYSPCA), The intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action was properly dismissed. The Fourth Department explained the elements of each cause of action and noted that the documents submitted to prove the truth of the allegedly defamatory statements were not “essentially undeniable” and did not “utterly refute” the allegations:

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for tortious interference with employment, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). According to the complaint, at all times relevant to this appeal, plaintiff was the Executive Director of the Central New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (CNYSPCA) and defendant Stacy Laxen, DVM was a veterinarian for the CNYSPCA. During her tenure with the CNYSPCA, plaintiff directed that several cats be euthanized due to an outbreak of ringworm. Soon thereafter, and based on plaintiff’s decision to approve euthanasia without input from a veterinarian, defendant Board of Directors of the CNYSPCA terminated plaintiff’s employment. …

“[A]n at-will employee may assert a cause of action alleging tortious interference with employment where he or she can demonstrate that the defendant utilized wrongful means to effect his or her termination . . . In such cases, the plaintiff is required to show: (1) the existence of a business relationship between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendants’ interference with that business relationship; (3) that the defendants acted with the sole purpose of harming plaintiff or used dishonest, unfair, improper or illegal means that amounted to a crime or an independent tort; and (4) that such acts resulted in the injury to the plaintiff’s relationship with the third party” … .  …

… [W]e conclude that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Laxen’s statements constituted defamation per se inasmuch as they purportedly injured plaintiff in her “professional standing”… . Furthermore, despite the court’s determination that plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure and Laxen was protected by the common interest qualified privilege, accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, we conclude that the complaint sufficiently alleged that Laxen acted with the requisite malice necessary to overcome those defenses … . Conklin v Laxen, 2020 NY Slip Op 00958, Fourth Dept 2-7-20

 

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