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SUPREME COURT DID NOT RULE ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL, MATTER REMITTED FOR A RULING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, remitting the matter to Supreme Court, noted that Supreme Court did not rule on defendant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal:

Defendant … contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction with respect to the weapon possession counts and that the court thus erred in denying his motion for a trial order of dismissal. At the close of the People’s case, defendant moved for a trial order of dismissal on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his possession of certain weapons, and the court reserved decision. Defendant renewed his motion at the conclusion of all the evidence, and the court again reserved decision. There is no indication in the record that the court ruled on defendant’s motion. We do not address defendant’s contention because, “in accordance with People v Concepcion (17 NY3d 192, 197-198 [2011]) and People v LaFontaine (92 NY2d 470, 474 [1998], rearg denied 93 NY2d 849 [1999]), we cannot deem the court’s failure to rule on the . . . motion as a denial thereof” … . We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to Supreme Court for a ruling on defendant’s motion  … . People v Bennett, 2020 NY Slip Op 00957, Fourth Dept 2-7-20

 

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