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BY NOT SEEKING THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE DEBT IN THE 90-DAY NOTICE PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE DE-ACCELERATED THE DEBT MAKING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION TIMELY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff, by demonstrating it did not demand the full debt, but rather demanded only the amount needed to cure the default, presented sufficient proof that the debt had not been accelerated, and therefore the action was timely, to warrant restoring the matter to the calendar. The action had been dismissed when plaintiff did not appear at a scheduled conference. Defendant had moved to dismiss alleging the debt had been accelerated and the action was time-barred:

Plaintiff … moved, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), to vacate the dismissal order and reinstate the claim. * * *

… [P]laintiff provided evidence that it took affirmative action to de-accelerate the mortgage, which would have stopped the running of the statute of limitations on the mortgage debt. The 90-day notice provided to defendant sought an amount lower than the accelerated amount, which may evidence an intent to de-accelerate. While seeking a lower amount in and of itself is not enough to establish, as a matter of law, that the 90-day notice “destroy[ed] the effect of the sworn statement that the plaintiff had elected to accelerate the maturity of the debt” … . it is sufficient to meet the “minimal showing” required on a motion to restore … . Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Rosenberg, 2020 NY Slip Op 00814, First Dept 2-4-20

 

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THE PORTION OF THE ARBITRATOR’S AWARD WHICH CONFLICTED WITH THE COLLECTIVE... SEX TRAFFICKING CONVICTION AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).