You are here: / / TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DECLARED A MISTRIAL TO ACCOMMODATE...
, , ,

TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DECLARED A MISTRIAL TO ACCOMMODATE A JUROR’S WEEKEND PLANS; WRIT OF PROHIBITION GRANTED; RETRIAL BARRED; INDICTMENT DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, granting petitioner’s application for a writ of prohibition and dismissing the indictment, determined the trial court should not have, sua sponte, declared a mistrial to accommodate a juror’s weekend travel plans. Retrial was barred:

The trial court was not compelled by manifest necessity to declare a mistrial and terminate the proceedings …, and accordingly, retrial is barred under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal and New York State Constitutions … . It was an abuse of discretion to declare a mistrial in order to accommodate a juror’s weekend travel plans, including a Friday, which she belatedly informed the court about during deliberations, where the court, as requested by defendant, reasonably could have directed the juror to report for deliberations the following day, and the court also failed to confirm that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked at the time … . Matter of Bannister v Wiley, 2020 NY Slip Op 00522, First Dept 1-28-20

 

You might also like
THE PROMISE TO REPAY THE LOAN WAS NOT UNCONDITIONAL BUT RATHER THE DEFENDANT’S HAVING AVAILABLE CASH TO REPAY THE LOAN WAS A CONDITION PRECEDENT, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE DEFENDANT HAD AVAILABLE CASH, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENSE COUNSEL, DURING VOIR DIRE, RELIED ON THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATION THAT THE COMPLAINANT WOULD NOT TESTIFY, BEFORE OPENING STATEMENTS DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INFORMED THE COMPLAINANT WOULD TESTIFY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) VOTING AGREEMENT CONCERNED THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY, IT WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE-OF-FRAUDS PROHIBITION OF ORAL AGREEMENTS (FIRST DEPT). ​
Elements of Tampering with Physical Evidence
LEASE WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO THWART (NYC) RENT CONTROL AND WAS THEREFORE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE.
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYER SUFFERED NO DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF PLAINTIFF’S BREACH OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISION OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, DEFENDANT EMPLOYER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT; PLAINTIFF’S BREACH-OF-AN-ORAL-CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED EVIDENCE OF PARTIAL PERFORMANCE BY DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF’S RELIANCE ON THE ORAL MODIFICATION (FIRST DEPT).
FIREFIGHTER’S RULE DID NOT PRECLUDE NEGLIGENCE SUIT BY A POLICE OFFICER INJURED WHEN HE STEPPED OUT OF HIS VAN INTO A DEPRESSED AREA AROUND A SEWER GRATE, CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION (FIRST DEPT). ​
OPERATIVE DATE FOR POLICY COVERAGE WAS THE DATE THE POWER GENERATING TURBINE WAS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE, EVEN THOUGH THE DAMAGE WHICH ULTIMATELY LED TO THE SHUT DOWN HAPPENED BEFORE THE POLICY PERIOD (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE INTERIM DECISION ISSUED BY SUPREME COURT WAS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF AN ORDER;... BUILDING OWNER NOT LIABLE FOR ALLEGED FAILURE TO ENSURE A SMOKE DETECTOR WAS...