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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE RULINGS IN THIS CUSTODY/PARENTAL...
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE RULINGS IN THIS CUSTODY/PARENTAL ACCESS CASE, HEARINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD; THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this custody/parental access proceeding, determined Supreme Court should have conducted hearings because the evidence relied upon was insufficient. The Second Department further found there was insufficient evidence to support the sanctions imposed for allegedly frivolous conduct:

We disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination (1) awarding the defendant sole legal custody of the parties’ child, (2) denying that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was to direct therapeutic parental access with the child, (3) directing that parental access between the plaintiff and the child “shall take place in accordance with [the child’s] preferences,” and (4) granting the defendant’s motion for a restraining order prohibiting the plaintiff from interfering with the child’s life at school, without first conducting an evidentiary hearing … . …

Here, the record demonstrates unresolved factual issues so as to require a hearing on the issues of custody and parental access … . Moreover, in making its custody and parental access determination, the Supreme Court relied on the hearsay statements and conclusions of the forensic evaluator, whose opinions and credibility were untested by either party … . * * *

… [P]ursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, sanctions may be imposed against a party or the party’s attorney for frivolous conduct. Conduct is “frivolous if: (1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false” … . “A party seeking the imposition of a sanction or an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(c) has the burden of proof” … .

Here, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff’s conduct during the underlying motion practice was frivolous … . Brin v Shady, 2020 NY Slip Op 00256, Second Dept 1-17-20

 

January 15, 2020
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-01-15 10:14:282020-01-24 05:52:05THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE RULINGS IN THIS CUSTODY/PARENTAL ACCESS CASE, HEARINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD; THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT (SECOND DEPT). ​
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WHERE THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE CAUSES OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION AND THE TRIER OF FACT WOULD HAVE TO RESORT TO SPECULATION ABOUT WHETHER THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, THE ACTION MUST BE DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Action for Fraud Can Not Be Based Upon Same Allegations as Action for Breach of Contract​
Resort to Contempt for Failure to Make Payments Appropriate
CAUSES OF ACTION SEEKING TO ENFORCE A ZONING ORDINANCE AND COVENANTS IN ANOTHER’S DEED PROPERLY DISMISSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.
JUDGE WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT; ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN JOINED AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO APPEAR AT A SCHEDULED CONFERENCE (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION TO VACATE A REFEREE’S DEED PROPERLY DENIED, A SALE PRICE LOWER THAN MARKET VALUE DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE SALE, PURPORTED EVIDENCE OF A CONSPIRACY AMONG THE BIDDERS WAS IMPROPERLY SUBMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN REPLY PAPERS (SECOND DEPT).
EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF DID NOT TIMELY FILE A NOTE OF ISSUE AND DID NOT COMPLY WITH A PRIOR DISCOVERY ORDER, THE JUDGE WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO, SUA SPONTE, DISMISS THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD NOT BEEN SERVED WITH A VAILD 90-DAY DEMAND TO FILE A NOTE OF ISSUE (SECOND DEPT).
THE AFFIDAVITS AND REAL ESTATE CONTRACT SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS DID NOT CONSTITUTE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH UTTERLY REFUTED THE ALLEGATIONS OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION IN THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

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