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THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE RULINGS IN THIS CUSTODY/PARENTAL ACCESS CASE, HEARINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD; THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this custody/parental access proceeding, determined Supreme Court should have conducted hearings because the evidence relied upon was insufficient. The Second Department further found there was insufficient evidence to support the sanctions imposed for allegedly frivolous conduct:

We disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination (1) awarding the defendant sole legal custody of the parties’ child, (2) denying that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was to direct therapeutic parental access with the child, (3) directing that parental access between the plaintiff and the child “shall take place in accordance with [the child’s] preferences,” and (4) granting the defendant’s motion for a restraining order prohibiting the plaintiff from interfering with the child’s life at school, without first conducting an evidentiary hearing … . …

Here, the record demonstrates unresolved factual issues so as to require a hearing on the issues of custody and parental access … . Moreover, in making its custody and parental access determination, the Supreme Court relied on the hearsay statements and conclusions of the forensic evaluator, whose opinions and credibility were untested by either party … . * * *

… [P]ursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, sanctions may be imposed against a party or the party’s attorney for frivolous conduct. Conduct is “frivolous if: (1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false” … . “A party seeking the imposition of a sanction or an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(c) has the burden of proof” … .

Here, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff’s conduct during the underlying motion practice was frivolous … . Brin v Shady, 2020 NY Slip Op 00256, Second Dept 1-17-20

 

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