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RESPONDENT, THE PREVAILING PARTY IN AN ARBITRATION, WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR THE SUBSEQUENT ARTICLE 75 PROCEEDING TO VACATE THE AWARD AND FOR THE APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the respondent, who prevailed in an arbitration proceeding, was entitled to attorney’s fees for the subsequent Article 75 proceedings and appeal to the Appellate Division:

Judgment … awarding respondent attorney’s fees in the sum total of $980 in connection with a no-fault arbitration award … [remanded] to Supreme Court for a determination of respondent’s reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the article 75 proceeding brought by petitioner to vacate the arbitration award and on this appeal … .

“The attorney’s fee for services rendered … in a court appeal from a master arbitration award and any further appeals, shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR § 65-4.10[j][4]). The term “court appeal” applies to a proceeding taken pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award … . Accordingly, respondent TC Acupuncture, as a prevailing applicant for payment by petitioner insurer of attorney’s fees in an article 75 proceeding reviewing an arbitration award, is entitled to an additional award of attorney’s fees, as fixed by the court, for its motion to modify the order, in a 2015 article 75 proceeding denying Countrywide’s petition to vacate the arbitration award, to include a ruling confirming the arbitration and its opposition to Countrywide’s motion to reargue that order. Supreme Court erred in failing to award these additional fees.

Respondent is also entitled to the attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal to this Court of the order issued in the article 75 proceeding, to be fixed by the court, upon remand, pursuant to 11 NYCRR § 65-4.10(j)(4) … . Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v TC Acupuncture P.C., 2020 NY Slip Op 00048, First Dept 1-2-20

 

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