You are here: / / PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT...

PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFF FELL ATTEMPTING TO USE AN INVERTED BUCKET TO STEP UP TO AN ELEVATED PLATFORM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff fell attempting to use an inverted bucket to access an elevated platform:

The protection of Labor Law § 240(1) encompasses plaintiff[‘s] … fall while trying to access an elevated work platform by stepping up onto an inverted bucket, an inadequate safety device that failed to provide proper protection … . Moreover, defendants failed to cite any evidence rebutting the affidavit by plaintiff’s foreman stating that stairs or other access points to the work platform were either restricted or blocked by materials. Because no safety devices were available to plaintiff to access the platform, as a matter of fact and law, plaintiff’s attempt to use the inverted bucket cannot be the sole proximate cause of his accident … .

Because no stairways, ramps, or runaways were available to plaintiff to access the platform, he was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated upon Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7(f) … . Ferguson v Durst Pyramid, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 09388, First Dept 12-26-19

 

You might also like
JUROR DID NOT REVEAL DURING VOIR DIRE SHE HAD APPLIED FOR A JOB IN THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE TWO DAYS BEFORE, DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF AN IMPARTIAL JURY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).
Insufficient Foundation for Introduction of Grand Jury Testimony as Past Recollection Recorded—No Showing Recollection Was “Fairly Fresh” and Accurate at the Time of the Grand Jury Appearance
THE INSURED, SPACE NEEDLE, LLC, IS LOCATED IN WASHINGTON STATE; ALTHOUGH THE INSURANCE POLICY NAMED NEW YORK AS THE FORUM AND REQUIRED THE APPLICATION OF NEW YORK LAW FOR ANY LAWSUITS, THE WASHINGTON INSURANCE CODE RENDERED SUCH PROVISIONS VOID; THEREFORE THE INSURER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ANTI-SUIT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN NEW YORK (FIRST DEPT).
STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT THE PAINT CONTAINED LEAD DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE INTERIOR OF THE BUILDING WAS PAINTED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1960; HOWEVER QUESTIONS OF FACT WERE RAISED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF LEAD PAINT AND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PAINT AND INFANT PLAINTIFF’S LEAD POISONING, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT).
Question of Fact Whether ​”Intervening Criminal Act” at Homeless Facility Was Foreseeable
PLAINTIFF FELL LEAVING AN ELEVATOR HE HAD JUST MODIFIED TO PREVENT ACCESS TO A FLOOR; HIS WORK WAS NOT ROUTINE MAINTENANCE; INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISIONS ABOUT GUARDING HAZARDOUS OPENINGS APPLIED; ONE DEFENDANT MAY BE LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT; LABOR LAW 200, 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). ​
BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTIONS BY CERTIFICATEHOLDERS AGAINST THE TRUSTEE FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES TRUSTS DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANTS PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE OF SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS OR LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE... GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 5-321 VOIDS A LEASE PROVISION ABSOLVING THE LANDLORD...