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VENUE FOR THIS HYBRID ARTICLE 78/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING TO ANNUL A TOWN LOCAL LAW WHICH CREATED A WILDLIFE OVERLAY DISTRICT IS THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE TOWN IS LOCATED PURSUANT TO TOWN LAW SECTION 66 (1) (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice DeJoseph, determined Supreme Court properly found that Orleans County, not Niagara County, was the correct venue for this hybrid Article 78/declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate a Town of Shelby Local Law creating a wildlife refuge overlay district, and further seeking to annul the Town Board’s negative declaration under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The legal analysis is too detailed to be fully summarized here:

The primary issue raised on this appeal involves the interplay between three statutory provisions concerning venue, i.e., CPLR 504 (2), CPLR 506 (b), and Town Law § 66 (1) and, ultimately, whether Supreme Court properly granted the motion of respondents-defendants (respondents) to transfer venue of this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action from Niagara County to Orleans County. We conclude that the court properly transferred venue pursuant to Town Law § 66 (1). …

Town Law § 66 (1) provides that “[t]he place of trial of all actions and proceedings against a town or any of its officers or boards shall be the county in which the town is situated.”

We conclude that Town Law § 66 applies and, as such, the proper venue in the instant action is Orleans County rather than Niagara County. Matter of Zelazny Family Enters., LLC v Town of Shelby, 2019 NY Slip Op 09124, Fourth Dept 12-20-19

 

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