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AN ORDER ADDRESSING WHETHER DOCUMENTS SOUGHT IN DISCOVERY ARE PRIVILEGED IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) an order concerning whether documents sought in discovery were privileged, noted that the order was appealable as of right:

During discovery, a dispute arose over allegedly privileged documents that plaintiff withheld or redacted. In its privilege logs, plaintiff asserted that many of the documents were protected from disclosure on three grounds, i.e., that they were material prepared in anticipation of litigation (see CPLR 3101 [d] [2]), attorney work product (see CPLR 3101 [c]), or protected by the attorney-client privilege (see CPLR 4503 [1]). Plaintiff asserted that a few documents were not discoverable on the sole basis that they were materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. Campany and the Travelers defendants separately moved, inter alia, to compel plaintiff’s disclosure of various documents or, in the alternative, for an in camera review of the documents. Plaintiff moved for, among other things, a protective order, contending that all communications involving attorneys or litigation experts on and after October 24, 2016 were presumptively privileged because the Travelers defendants and plaintiff contemplated litigation at that time. Supreme Court denied the Travelers defendants’ motion, denied in part Campany’s motion, and granted plaintiff’s motion by, as relevant here, ordering that all documents of plaintiff created on and after October 24, 2016 were not discoverable because they were material prepared in anticipation of litigation. Campany and the Travelers defendants appeal.

Initially, we reject plaintiff’s contention that the order is not appealable. CPLR 5701 (a) (2) (v) provides that, with limited exceptions, which are not applicable here, an appeal may be taken to this Court as of right from an order where the motion it decided was made upon notice and it “affects a substantial right.” An order granting a protective order and precluding discovery of numerous documents affects a substantial right of Campany and the Travelers defendants, and the order is thus appealable as of right … . John Mezzalingua Assoc., LLC v Travelers Indem. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 09157, Fourth Dept 12-20-19

 

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