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PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A SECOND EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; DEFENDANT WAS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING HE RESIDED AT AN ADDRESS DIFFERENT FROM THE ADDRESS ON FILE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff was properly granted a second extension of time, in the interest of justice, to serve the summons and complaint. The court noted that defendant Ewing was estopped from contending his address was different from the address indicated in the Department of Motor Vehicles; (DMV’s) records:

Ewing maintains that he should have been served at an address which differed from the Strauss Street address listed on the police report, as well as the Atlantic Avenue address and the Georgia address. However, a search of the DMV records conducted on June 23, 2017, more than six weeks after the traverse hearing, reflected that the Atlantic Avenue address, where the plaintiff had attempted to effectuate service, was the current documented address for Ewing. Since the record demonstrates that Ewing failed to notify the DMV of his change of residence, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 505(5), he was estopped from raising a claim of defective service … .

Furthermore, we note that “the more flexible interest of justice’ standard accommodates late service that might be due to mistake, confusion, or oversight, so long as there is no prejudice to the defendant” …  Here, the plaintiff demonstrated that there was no demonstrable prejudice to Ewing, particularly in light of evidence that he had actual notice of the action … . Indeed, the record indicates that Ewing served an answer to the complaint in April 2015, shortly after the expiration of the 120-day period for service … . Mighty v Deshommes, 2019 NY Slip Op 08996, Second Dept 12-18-19

 

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