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PLAINTIFF COULD NOT PROCEED ON A THEORY NOT RAISED IN THE NOTICE OF CLAIM; ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, IT COULD BE CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, held that plaintiff-student could not proceed based upon a theory not included in the notice of claim. Plaintiff, who alleged she was sexually assaulted at a BOCES facility, did not allege in her notice of claim that the school district (North Shore), which did not have custody of her when she was assaulted, was also liable because it had formulated an Individualized Education Program for her. The court noted that the issue, although raised for the first time on appeal, could be considered because it was a question of law that could not have been avoided by the lower court:

“A plaintiff seeking to recover in tort against a municipality must serve a notice of claim to enable authorities to investigate, collect evidence and evaluate the merits of the claim” … . “A notice of claim must set forth, inter alia, the nature of the claim, and the time, place, and manner in which the claim arose” … . “[A] mistake, omission, irregularity or defect made in good faith in the notice of claim required to be served by [General Municipal Law § 50-e], not pertaining to the manner or time of service thereof, may be corrected, supplied or disregarded, as the case may be, in the discretion of the court, provided it shall appear that the other party was not prejudiced thereby” (General Municipal Law § 50-e[6]). Under General Municipal Law § 50-e(6), “[a] notice of claim may be amended only to correct good faith and nonprejudicial technical mistakes, omissions, or defects, not to substantively change the nature of the claim or the theory of liability” … .

We agree with North Shore that the plaintiff may not proceed under the theory that North Shore negligently failed to formulate an appropriate IEP for her, as the plaintiff did not include this theory in her notice of claim. Although North Shore did not raise this argument before the Supreme Court, we may consider it because “it presents an issue of law that appears on the face of the record, and could not have been avoided had it been raised at the proper juncture” … . In her notice of claim, the only theory of liability that the plaintiff asserted was negligent supervision. In opposition to North Shore’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff contended for the first time that North Shore had negligently failed to formulate an appropriate IEP for her. This was not a technical change, but was an impermissible substantive change to the theory of liability … . I. T. K. v Nassau Boces Educ. Found., Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 08557, Second Dept 11-27-19

 

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