You are here: / / PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO FILE LATE NOTICES OF CLAIM AGAINST...
,

PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO FILE LATE NOTICES OF CLAIM AGAINST THE COUNTY IN THIS GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION CASE; THE COUNTY HAD TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS AND THE COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THE THREE-MONTH DELAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition seeking leave to file late notices of claim should have been granted. The claims arise from groundwater contamination linked to chemicals (PFOS and PFOA) used at a county airport. The Second Department noted that the county had timely notice of the essential facts of the claims, the petition was brought three months after the notices of claim were due, and the county did not demonstrate and prejudice resulting from the delay:

… [T]he County’s alleged negligent ownership and operation of the Gabreski Airport site, resulting in contamination of the petitioners’ water supply with toxic chemicals, constitute the essential facts of the claims, which are common to all the petitioners and were made known to the County by the prior notices of claim … .

Inasmuch as the County acquired timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts of the petitioners’ claims, the petitioners made an initial showing that the County was not prejudiced by their delay in serving the notices of claim … . Moreover, the petitioners sought leave to serve late notices of claim only a little more than three months after the statutory period had expired … . In opposition, the County failed to rebut the petitioners’ showing that the County was not prejudiced by their delay with any particularized evidence … . The County did no more than assert that the petitioners failed to meet their burden to show that the late notice would not substantially prejudice the County … .

“A petitioner’s lack of a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving a timely notice of claim is not necessarily fatal when weighed against other relevant factors” … .  While the petitioners’ assertions that they were not aware of the County’s involvement in the cause of the incident does not constitute a reasonable excuse for their failure to file a timely notice of claim, the absence of a reasonable excuse “is not in and of itself fatal to the petition where, as here, there was actual notice and the absence of prejudice” … . Matter of Brooks v County of Suffolk, 2019 NY Slip Op 08561, Second Dept 11-27-19

 

You might also like
EVIDENCE THE CHILD WITNESSED A PHYSICAL ALTERCATION BETWEEN MOTHER AND FATHER WAS SUFFICIENT FOR A FINDING FATHER NEGLECTED THE CHILD (SECOND DEPT).
Odor of Marihuana Provided Probable Cause to Search Defendant’s Car and Person
THE HOUSING STABILITY AND TENANT PROTECTION ACT (HSTPA), BY ITS TERMS, APPLIES TO THIS HOLDOVER ACTION WHICH WAS PENDING WHEN THE HSTPA WAS ENACTED BUT HAS NOT PROCEEDED TO JUDGMENT; THEREFORE THE ACT NEED NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO PRECLUDE THE HOLDOVER ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
THE DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE FLOWER POT OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS; THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ON THAT ISSUE (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION, MADE BY PLAINTIFF’S NEW COUNSEL, TO VACATE A STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BY PRIOR COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PRIOR COUNSEL HAD THE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE STIPULATION AND PLAINTIFF CAN NOT LATER ARGUE PRIOR COUNSEL LACKED AUTHORITY (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF MORTGAGE SERVICER DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND DID NOT SUBMIT PROOF IT HAD BEEN DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO FORECLOSE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
THERE IS A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GRIEVANCE AND THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA); THE CITY’S PETITION TO PERMANENTLY STAY ARBITRATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) 1304, BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES OF OVER $34,000... LAW FIRM SANCTIONED FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT A MANDATORY MEDIATION SESSION TO...