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SCHOOL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF WATER ON THE FLOOR IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant school did not demonstrate it did not have constructive knowledge of water on the floor of the cafeteria where plaintiff slipped and fell:

… [T]he School District failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that it did not have constructive notice of the alleged water condition that caused the plaintiff to fall. The deposition testimony of the School District’s head custodian merely referred to the general cleaning and inspection practices of the custodial staff in relation to the south cafeteria of the school, but provided no evidence regarding any specific cleaning or inspection of the area in question relative to the time when the plaintiff’s accident occurred … . Williams v Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., 2019 NY Slip Op 08443, Second Dept 11-20-19

 

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