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PROBATION ONLY IS NOT A LEGAL SENTENCE FOR ASSAULT SECOND; ORDER OF PROTECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED IN FAVOR OF A PERSON WHO WAS NOT A VICTIM OR WITNESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendant could not be sentenced to probation only for assault and Supreme Court should not have issue an order of protection in favor of a person who was not a victim or a witness:

Penal Law § 60.05(5) mandates that a person convicted of the class D violent felony offense of assault in the second degree be sentenced to a term of imprisonment … . Such a sentence could consist of a determinate term of imprisonment of at least two years and no more than seven years … , or alternatively, a definite term of imprisonment of one year or less under Penal Law § 70.00(4) or an intermittent term of imprisonment under Penal Law § 85.00 … . Moreover, a split sentence of imprisonment and probation is also authorized … .

Consequently, as the defendant argues and the People concede, the defendant’s sentence of a term of probation only with respect to his conviction of assault in the second degree was illegal, and the sentence must be vacated and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Richmond County for resentencing or to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty … .

The defendant, a first time felony offender, requests that his sentence be equivalent to the amount of time that he has already served in connection with this conviction. Such a sentence would be a legal sentence if the sentencing court, in considering the circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s character, deems such a sentence to be proper … .

Further, as the defendant argues and the People concede, the Supreme Court had no authority to issue an order of protection in favor of an individual who was neither a victim of nor a witness to the crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty … . People v Ferguson, 2019 NY Slip Op 08424, Second Dept 11-20-19

 

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ALTHOUGH THE TOWN DEMONSTRATED THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS DID NOT HAVE NOTICE... PLEA TO ASSAULT FIRST WAS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE THE INTENT TO INFLICT SERIOUS PHYSICAL...