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ACTION AGAINST GAS COMPANY FOR CONTAMINATION OF REAL PROPERTY ACCRUED WHEN INJURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED AND WAS TIME BARRED; ACTION FOR NUISANCE RELATING TO REMEDIATION EFFORTS, HOWEVER, IS SUBJECT TO A DIFFERENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION AND WAS NOT TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the causes of action against a gas company to recover damages for contamination of real property were time-barred, but the nuisance actions stemming from remediation efforts were not time-barred:

“Generally, an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property must be commenced within three years of the injury” … . “[T]he three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances,” however, “shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier” (CPLR 214-c[2] …). “For purposes of CPLR 214-c, discovery occurs when, based upon an objective level of awareness of the dangers and consequences of the particular substance, the injured party discovers the primary condition on which the claim is based'” … .  …

… [T]he defendants here demonstrated that they undertook extensive efforts beginning in 1999 to inform and engage with property owners potentially affected by the contamination and remediation by conducting, among other things, door-to-door canvassing, direct mailings of newsletters and fact sheets, numerous public meetings, and highly visible and disruptive remediation work. The defendants also inspected the subject property twice in 2005 to determine whether certain remediation work between those inspections caused any damage, and mailed the results of their inspections to the plaintiff in 2006. … The defendants … established, prima facie, that the plaintiff should have discovered, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the primary condition upon which its exposure-related claims were based prior to January 22, 2007 … . …

We disagree, however, with the Supreme Court’s determination that the causes of action to recover damages for public and private nuisance allegedly arising from the defendants’ remediation work were time-barred … . These causes of action are subject to the limitations period in CPLR 214(4) rather than CPLR 214-c(2) because they do not seek “to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure” … .  Here, the papers submitted in support of the defendants’ motion demonstrated that there was no dispute that the defendants conducted remediation work in close proximity to the subject property shortly after new tenants signed a lease to occupy the space in 2008 … . Onder Realty, Inc. v Keyspan Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 07406, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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