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NEW JERSEY PAROLEE’S CONSENT TO SEARCH AS A CONDITION OF PAROLE DID NOT APPLY TO A SEARCH DONE BY NEW YORK CITY POLICE IN QUEENS; STATEMENTS MADE WITHOUT MIRANDA WARNINGS, INCLUDING THE CONSENT TO SEARCH, AS WELL AS THE FRUITS OF THE SEARCH, PROPERLY SUPPRESSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly suppressed statements made without Miranda warnings, including the consent to search a safe, as well as the firearms seized from the safe. Although defendant was on parole in New Jersey, the search was done in Queens by New York City police. Therefore the consent to search provided by parolees as a condition of parole was not applicable:

… [A]lthough Soto had consented to searches by New Jersey parole officers as a condition of his parole, the record reveals that the NYPD officers, not the New Jersey parole officers, searched the safe after they were notified that the New Jersey parole officers found what appeared to be heroin in the apartment. Accordingly, the People cannot rely on Soto’s consent given as a condition of parole to justify the warrantless search of the safe … . Furthermore, since the NYPD officers failed to advise Soto of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him and obtaining his consent to open the safe, his statements regarding the safe and his consent to open it cannot be characterized as voluntary … . Moreover, the People failed to proffer any argument as to why the warrantless search was proper as to Santiago. Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination granting those branches of Soto’s omnibus motion which were to suppress the firearms evidence and the statements made by him to the NYPD officers without the benefit of Miranda warnings, and that branch of Santiago’s omnibus motion which was to suppress the firearms evidence … . People v Santiago, 2019 NY Slip Op 07099, Second Dept 10-2-19

 

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