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THE PEOPLE DID NOT SUBMIT SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT A PERIOD OF TIME SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL CALCULATION, APPEAL HELD IN ABEYANCE AND MATTER SENT BACK FOR A HEARING AND REPORT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, sending the matter back for a hearing on defendant’s statutory speedy-trial motion to dismiss, determined defendant had met his burden to show a delay greater that six months but the People did not present sufficient evidence that a period of time should be excluded from the speedy trial calculation:

… [T]he defendant sustained his initial burden on the motion by alleging that a period of unexcused delay in excess of six months had elapsed since the date that he was arraigned on the felony complaint (see CPL 30.30[1][a]). In opposition, the People failed to conclusively demonstrate with “unquestionable documentary proof” that any periods within that time should be excluded (CPL 210.45[5][c] …). Moreover, the “court action sheet” provided to this Court on appeal, of which we may take judicial notice … , contained only an ambiguous notation purportedly regarding the defendant’s alleged waiver of his CPL 30.30 rights from May 5, 2014, to July 8, 2014 … . Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a hearing and thereafter a report on the defendant’s motion … . People v Perkins, 2019 NY Slip Op 06516, Second Dept 9-11-19

 

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