You are here: / / A SMALL AMOUNT OF COCAINE IN PLAIN VIEW IN DEFENDANT DRIVER’S POCKET...
,

A SMALL AMOUNT OF COCAINE IN PLAIN VIEW IN DEFENDANT DRIVER’S POCKET DID NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE TRUNK OF DEFENDANT’S CAR AFTER A TRAFFIC STOP (SECOND DEPT).

he Second Department, on an appeal by the People, determined finding a small amount of cocaine on defendant driver’s person did not provide probable cause to believe drugs would be in the trunk. Therefore the weapon and drugs found in the trunk, as well as defendant’s statements about searching the trunk, were properly suppressed:

… County Court concluded that the recovery of a small quantity of what appeared to be cocaine, along with a cut straw, in plain view on the defendant’s person, was insufficient to give the police probable cause to believe that additional contraband would be found in the vehicle’s trunk, particularly after a search of the passenger compartment revealed nothing. This Court has, in a factually similar case, reached the same conclusion … . Under the facts of this case, we decline to disturb the court’s finding as to lack of probable cause.

Contrary to the People’s contention, cases in which there is circumstantial evidence of recent drug use within the passenger compartment, such as when the police, during a routine traffic stop, detect the odor of burning marijuana …  are distinguishable, since such evidence provides good reason to believe that the unseen drugs may be located somewhere within the vehicle. By contrast, the fact that a small quantity of drugs is found on the defendant’s person, with no other drugs being found in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, does not, without more, provide probable cause to believe that additional drugs may be found in the trunk of the vehicle … . People v Garcia, 2019 NY Slip Op 06509, Second Dept 9-11-19

 

You might also like
IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, THE DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION HE DID NOT SEE PLAINTIFF’S BRAKE LIGHTS DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT SNOW-REMOVAL CONTRACTOR WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; NO “ESPINAL” EXCEPTIONS WERE ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT OR DEMONSTRATED IN RESPONSE TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; THE CONTRACT WITH THE PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT MAKE THE SNOW-REMOVAL CONTRACTOR COMPLETELY RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE PARKING LOT (SECOND DEPT).
INDICATING INCONSISTENT DECISIONS SHOULD NO LONGER BE FOLLOWED, THE SECOND DEPT DETERMINED SUPREME COURT COULD NOT DISMISS A CASE BASED ON THE FAILURE TO FILE A NOTE OF ISSUE WITHIN 90 DAYS OF THE COURT’S ORDER UNLESS THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF CPLR 3216 ARE COMPLIED WITH (SECOND DEPT).
HERE THE DEFENDANT TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW YORK VOTING RIGHTS ACT (NYVRA) WOULD FORCE THE TOWN TO VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE FORMER “EMERGENCY OR DISASTER TREATMENT PROTECTION ACT (EDTPA)” PROVIDED IMMUNITY TO HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS RE: COVID-19, HERE DEFENDANT NURSING HOME DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE THREE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMMUNITY WERE MET (SECOND DEPT).
Court Properly Permitted Administration of Medication to Involuntarily Committed Patient
A COMPRESSOR ROLLING OFF A PALLET JACK ONTO PLAINTIFF’S ANKLE WAS NOT AN ELEVATION-RELATED ACCIDENT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1), REGULATION-VIOLATION RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OPPOSITION PAPERS PROPERLY CONSIDERED, CRITERIA FOR LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL (SECOND DEPT).
Difference Between Law of the Case and Issue and Claim Preclusion Explained

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DAMAGES VERDICT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE AS INADEQUATE... AMENDMENT OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW TO REMOVE THE REQUIREMENT THAT...