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THE WORDING OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL DID NOT RESTRICT THE APPEAL TO THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BUT RATHER INCLUDED THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT; THE DISSENTER DISAGREED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant, over an extensive dissent, determined the notice of appeal did not restrict the appeal to the denial of plaintiff;s cross motion for summary judgment, but rather encompassed the appeal of the grant of summary judgment dismissing the complaint:

… [W]e reject the assertion of defendant and our dissenting colleague that plaintiff’s notice of appeal limits our review to that part of the order and judgment that denied plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment. The notice of appeal provides, in relevant part, that plaintiff “hereby appeals . . . from the . . . [o]rder and [j]udgment . . . denying [p]laintiff’s [c]ross[ m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment. Plaintiff appeals from each and every part of said [o]rder denying [p]laintiff’s [c]ross[ m]otion.” Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s position, inasmuch as the notice of appeal states that plaintiff sought to appeal from “each and every part” of the order and judgment and does not contain language restricting the appeal to only a specific part thereof, we conclude that the appeal is not limited to review of the denial of plaintiff’s cross motion and that the reference thereto simply constitutes language describing the order and judgment … .

Our determination that the reference to the cross motion in the notice of appeal is descriptive and does not constitute evidence that plaintiff excluded from her appeal that part of the order and judgment granting defendant’s motion is further supported by the fact that, in her cross motion, plaintiff expressly sought as part of the requested relief “[a]n [o]rder denying defendant’s [m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment in its entirety.” Cline v Code 2019 NY Slip Op 06251, Fourth Dept 8-22-19

 

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