You are here: / / DAY CARE CENTER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION...
,

DAY CARE CENTER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant day care center’s motion for summary judgment in this negligent supervision case was properly denied. The infant plaintiff allegedly was injured while in the care of the day care center. The facts were not described:

The defendant, as a provider of day care services, was under a duty to adequately supervise the children in its charge and may be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision … . “A plaintiff is not required to exclude every other possible cause, but need only offer evidence from which proximate cause may be reasonably inferred. [The p]laintiff’s burden of proof on this issue is satisfied if the possibility of another explanation for the event is sufficiently remote or technical to enable the jury to reach its verdict based not upon speculation, but upon the logical inferences to be drawn from the evidence” … .

Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the infant plaintiff’s injuries were not proximately caused by its negligence. The defendant’s submissions failed to negate a reasonable inference that the injury occurred at the defendant’s day care center and that the defendant failed to provide adequate supervision … . A.D.G. v Children’s Ark Daycare Ctr., Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 05959, Second Dept 7-31-19

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF DID NOT SATISFACTORILY EXPLAIN THE DELAY IN BRINGING THE UNTIMELY CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THEREFORE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED THE MERITS OF THE MOTION (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) ACTION WAS STRUCK BY A PIPE WHICH FELL AS IT WAS BEING HOISTED FROM A TRUCK; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ADD THE VIOLATION OF ADDITIONAL INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISIONS TO THE BILL OF PARTICULARS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE DENTISTS’ FEE-SPLITTING AGREEMENT VIOLATED THE EDUCATION LAW; A COURT WILL NOT ENFORCE AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT (SECOND DEPT).
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH CPLR 3216 OR 22 NYCRR 202.7, AND THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR A “SUA SPONTE” DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT).
BECAUSE THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOCTRINE IS DEPENDENT UPON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FROM WHICH INFERENCES MUST BE DRAWN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS USUALLY NOT APPROPRIATE; HERE A GARAGE DOOR CLOSED OR FELL ON PLAINTIFF; PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE PROSECUTOR’S REASONS FOR STRIKING THREE BLACK PROSPECTIVE JURORS WERE EITHER NOT RELEVANT TO THE CASE OR INACCURATE AND WERE DEEMED PRETEXTUAL; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT RAISED ABOUT WHETHER A SEPARATION AGREEMENT WAS UNCONSCIONABLE.
Trial Judge Can Rescind Mistrial Declaration; Retrial Okay Where Defendant Consents to Mistrial​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE VICTIM IN THIS KIDNAPPING CASE ASKED THE DEFENDANT IF SHE COULD GO WITH... ADVERSE POSSESSION AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS LAKE...