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SPOLIATION WARRANTED STRIKING THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the destruction of plaintiff’s truck, which was allegedly struck by defendant’s truck, warranted striking the complaint:

… [O]n their motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the complaint, the defendants sustained their burden of establishing that the plaintiff was obligated to preserve the truck at the time it was purportedly “seized and disposed” of, that the truck had been seized and disposed of before the defendants had an opportunity to inspect it, and that the truck was relevant to the litigation … . Furthermore, the defendants demonstrated that their ability to prove their defense had been significantly, if not fatally, compromised by the loss of the truck. Under the circumstances presented, the sanction of striking the complaint was appropriate … . Delmur, Inc. v School Constr. Auth., 2019 NY Slip Op 05764, Second Dept 7-24-19\

 

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