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ARTICLE 78 ACTION SEEKING TO PROHIBIT THE TRIAL JUDGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE FROM EXCLUDING TESTIMONY AS PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE DISMISSED AS INAPPROPRIATE; MATTER CONSIDERED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Article 78 proceeding brought by the district attorney against the trial judge in a criminal case seeking prohibition should have been dismissed. The trial judge had ruled that the conversations between an attorney and the defendant at the scene of the crime were protected by attorney-client privilege. The Article 78 action sought to prohibit the trial judge from adhering to that ruling. At the time of this Article 78 proceeding the criminal trial was over and defendant had been convicted. The matter was considered as an exception to the mootness doctrine:

Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and, in cases involving the exercise of judicial authority, “is available only where there is a clear legal right, and then only when a court . . . acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers” … . Respondent had jurisdiction over the criminal action against Mercer … and was empowered to preclude Doyle from testifying about matters protected by the attorney-client privilege … . Petitioner’s core complaint is that respondent erred in determining the scope of that privilege, and she may be correct … . Nevertheless, “prohibition will not lie as a means of seeking collateral review of mere trial errors of substantive law or procedure, however egregious the error may be, and however cleverly the error may be characterized by counsel as an excess of jurisdiction or power” … . To allow review of such matters would have an array of negative impacts, encouraging gamesmanship, “erect[ing] an additional avenue of judicial scrutiny in a collateral proceeding and . . . frustrat[ing] the statutory or even constitutional limits on review” … . Thus, inasmuch as petitioner does not point to “an unlawful use or abuse of the entire action or proceeding,” but rather “an unlawful procedure or error in the action or proceeding itself related to the proper purpose of the action or proceeding,” prohibition will not lie … . Matter of Heggen v Sise, 2019 NY Slip Op 05620, Third Dept 7-10-19

 

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