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NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES IN THIS STUDENT-PUSHES-STUDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the school district’s motion for summary judgment in this negligent supervision, student-pushed-by-student, case should have been granted. Negligent supervision was not the proximate cause of the injury:

… [T]he infant plaintiff, a kindergarten student at a school in the defendant … School District … , allegedly was injured when she was pushed into a wall by a fellow kindergarten student while they were lining up outside their classroom before the afternoon session. …

“Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” … . However, where an accident occurs in so short a span of time that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented it, lack of supervision is not the proximate cause of the injury and summary judgment in favor of a defendant charged with the duty of reasonable supervision is warranted … .

Here, the School District established, prima facie, that the incident occurred in so short a period of time that any negligent supervision on its part was not a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s alleged injuries … . M.P. v Central Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 2019 NY Slip Op 05553, Second Dept 7-10-19

third party assault

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