You are here: / / ANY ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS...

ANY ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS HARMLESS BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF THE TOP COUNT AND THE HIGHEST LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WAS AVAILABLE TO THE JURY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals determined denying a request for the jury to be instructed on lesser included offenses in this murder case was harmless error:

Even assuming the court erred in denying defendant’s request to submit the crimes of manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide to the jury as lesser included offenses of the charged crimes of murder in the second degree and manslaughter in the first degree, the error was harmless … . The Appellate Division properly concluded that defendant’s conviction of the lesser inclusory count of first-degree manslaughter, which it dismissed as required by CPL 300.40 (3) (b), did not change the harmless error analysis. Under the circumstances presented here, the jury’s guilty verdict on the indictment’s highest count despite the availability of the next lesser included offense for their consideration, “forecloses [defendant’s] challenge to the court’s refusal to charge the remote lesser included offenses” … , because it dispels any speculation as to whether the jury might have reached a guilty verdict on “still lower degree[s] of homicide” … . People v McIntosh, 2019 NY Slip Op 05186, CtApp 6-27-19

 

You might also like
Defense Counsel Should Have Been Allowed to Refresh Witness’s Recollection With a Prior Statement/Conviction Reversed
Environmental Clean-Up Indemnification Agreement Between Seller and Buyer of Property Triggered by Department of Environmental Conservation’s (DEC’s) “Potentially Responsible Party (PRP)” Letter to Buyer
Pre-Litigation Statements Made by an Attorney (Here In a Cease and Desist Letter) Are Protected by Qualified, Not Absolute, Privilege—Such Statements Are Privileged If Not Motivated by Malice and If Pertinent to Anticipated Litigation
TENANT’S HUSBAND HAD MOVED TO A NURSING HOME, DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL PROPERLY ONLY COUNTED TENANT’S PORTION OF THE COUPLE’S INCOME TO FIND HER ELIGIBLE FOR RENT CONTROL (CT APP).
NO REASONABLE VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED ANYTHING LESS THAN SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY, REQUEST FOR A JURY CHARGE ON ASSAULT THIRD WAS PROPERLY DENIED (CT APP). ​
Because the Landlord Engaged in Fraud, the Four-Year Rent-Overcharge Statute of Limitations Runs Back Four Years from When the Rent Overcharge Action Was Brought/Criteria for Collateral Estoppel Explained (Not Met Here)/Question of Fact Re: Piercing Corporate Veil
In Cases Not Involving Death or Bodily Injury Arising from an Accident, Whether a Notice of Disclaimer is Timely Is Governed by Common Law Waiver and Estoppel Principles, Not by the Provisions of Insurance law 3420
REINSURANCE POLICIES TO BE INTERPRETED USING STANDARD CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION OR RULE OF CONSTRUCTION CONCERNING WHETHER A COVERAGE CAP INCLUDES ONLY LOSS, OR INCLUDES BOTH LOSS AND LITIGATION COSTS (CT APP).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DENIAL OF THE REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON ASSAULT THIRD AS A LESSER INCLUDED... CONVICTION AFFIRMED, THREE-JUDGE DISSENT ARGUED THE APPELLATE DIVISION EXCEEDED...