You are here: / / CHILD CONCEIVED WITH AN EGG FROM AN ANONYMOUS DONOR AND CARRIED BY A GESTATIONAL...
,

CHILD CONCEIVED WITH AN EGG FROM AN ANONYMOUS DONOR AND CARRIED BY A GESTATIONAL SURROGATE PURSUANT TO AN UNPAID SURROGACY CONTRACT MAY BE ADOPTED BY THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the biological father of a child conceived with an egg from an anonymous donor and carried by a gestational surrogate can adopt the child. Family Court had held that the unpaid surrogacy contract was against public policy and should not be legitimized by adoption. Family Court also held that a biological father cannot adopt his own child. The Second Department rejected both arguments in an extensive opinion which cannot fairly be summarized here:

While commercial surrogacy contracts subject participants, and those who assist in the formation of such contracts, to civil penalties or felony conviction (see Domestic Relations Law § 123; Social Services Law §§ 374[6]; 389), the only sanction against unpaid surrogacy contracts is to treat them as void and unenforceable (see Domestic Relations Law § 122 …). …

… [T]he fact that a child was born as the result of an unenforceable surrogacy agreement does not foreclose an adoption of the resulting child, upon the surrogate’s consent … . …

There is nothing in the text of the Domestic Relations Law which precludes a parent from adopting his or her own biological child. While adoption, as we recognized above, is a statutory creation, the adoption sought here is authorized by the governing statute and there is nothing in the statute which precludes it. Further, to the extent that the Legislature has contemplated this subject, it has permitted adoptions notwithstanding an existing biological connection.

Domestic Relations Law § 110 expressly provides that “[a]n adult or minor married couple together may adopt a child of either of them born in or out of wedlock.”  Matter of John (Joseph G.), 2019 NY Slip Op 05132, Second Dept 6-26-17

 

You might also like
STATE DOES NOT HAVE A DUTY TO WARN SWIMMERS OF RIP CURRENTS AT STATE BEACHES.
UNEXECUTED CONTRACT THAT COULD NOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN A LIFETIME NOT ENFORCEABLE, ATTORNEY WHO REPRESENTED THE DEFENDANT LLC SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED IN THIS ACTION BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF A DECEASED MEMBER (SECOND DEPT).
Nothing in the Documentation Submitted to the Lender Raised Any Questions About the Applicant’s Authority, as the Sole Member, to Enter the Mortgage on Behalf of Defendant Limited Liability Company—Therefore the Affirmative Defense Alleging the Mortgage Was Invalid Because there Were Undisclosed Members of the Limited Liability Company Was Properly Dismissed
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION IS DETERMINED BY THE NATURE OF THE UNDERLYING ACTION, HERE CONVERSION AND FRAUD (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF, A TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WAS WALKING IN THE STREET WHEN DEFENDANT STRUCK HIM AFTER TAKING HIS EYES OFF THE ROAD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
MOTHER’S MOTION FOR FINDINGS ALLOWING HER CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN EXTRA TIME TO COMPLETE DISCOVERY, THE TIME TO FILE A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS EXTENDED AS WELL (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LADDERS WERE AVAILABLE, PLAINTIFF FELL WHEN AN INVERTED BUCKET HE WAS STANDING ON TIPPED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

HARDSHIP WAIVER TO ALLOW CONSTRUCTION OF A SINGLE FAMILY HOME IN THE CORE PRESERVATION... DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT TO HIS MOTHER, ON THE PHONE, ABOUT NEEDING THE ASSISTANCE...