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PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO SURPLUS PROCEEDS AFTER A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined petitioner was not entitled to the surplus proceeds after a tax foreclosure sale:

We reject petitioners’ contention that they have a right to the surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale. As respondent correctly contends, petitioners’ application for surplus proceeds was improperly predicated upon provisions of RPAPL article 13 that apply to surplus monies arising from the sale of property in mortgage foreclosure proceedings (see e.g.RPAPL 1361 [1]). RPAPL article 13, entitled “Action to Foreclose a Mortgage,” does not apply to properties acquired by a tax district pursuant to an in rem foreclosure proceeding under RPTL article 11. Thus, petitioners’ reliance on RPAPL article 13 and cases involving mortgage foreclosures is misplaced … . …

Moreover, petitioners are not entitled to surplus proceeds under RPTL article 11. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion that RPTL article 11 is “silent” regarding any remaining interest that former property owners may have, such as entitlement to surplus proceeds upon the sale of the property following a default judgment of foreclosure, the statute provides that, when property owners neither redeem the property nor interpose an answer, the tax district is entitled to a deed conveying an estate in fee simple absolute and the property owners are “barred and forever foreclosed of all . . . right, title, interest, claim, lien or equity of redemption” that they may have had in the property (RPTL 1136 [3] …). Where the tax district obtains a valid default judgment of foreclosure, which is presumed here given that the default judgment is not subject to challenge on this appeal, the formr property owners are not “entitled to any compensation upon the resale of the property” … , and the tax district may “retain . . . the entire proceeds from [the re]sale” … . Matter of Hoge v Chautauqua County, 2019 NY Slip Op 04821, Fourth Dept 6-14-19

 

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