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A PRIOR FORECLOSURE ACTION DISMISSED FOR LACK OF STANDING DID NOT ACCELERATE THE MORTGAGE DEBT, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THEREFORE, DID NOT START TO RUN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the prior foreclosure action, which was dismissed on the ground the plaintiff lacked standing, did not accelerate the mortgage debt. Therefore the statute of limitations was not triggered by the dismissed action:

[E]ven if a mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due, and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire debt” … . Acceleration occurs, inter alia, “when a creditor commences an action to foreclose upon a note and mortgage and seeks, in the complaint, payment of the full balance due” … . “[A]n acceleration of a mortgaged debt, by either written notice or the commencement of an action, is only valid if the party making the acceleration had standing at that time to do so” … .

Auguste contends that the commencement of the prior action in 2007 accelerated the debt, and that the commencement of the instant action, seven years later, was beyond the statute of limitations. Where, as here, the prior action is dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing, the purported acceleration is a nullity, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run at the time of the purported acceleration … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Auguste, 2019 NY Slip Op 04747, Second Dept 6-12-19

 

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