The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction based upon the People’s failure to turn over Brady material relevant to the impeachment of a key prosecution witness (JA), and the prosecutor’s failure to correct that witness’s testimony, should not have been granted. The opinion includes a detailed recitation of the evidence which can not be fairly summarized here. In a nutshell, the Court of Appeals held that any Brady violation that might have occurred, in light of the extensive impeachment evidence forcefully used by defense counsel, the violation was not “material” in that it could not have affected the verdict:
… [D]efendant brought [a] CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction … . … [D]efendant asserted that the People had violated their Brady obligation by failing to turn over evidence that there was an agreement to confer a benefit on JA in exchange for his testimony at defendant’s murder trial. In addition, defendant asserted that the trial prosecutor personally intervened in JA’s burglary case by procuring his release without bail during the June 13th drug court appearance, failed to correct JA’s trial testimony to specify that she was the “DA” who participated on June 13th, and failed to correct his characterization of his performance as ‘good’ in the drug treatment program … . * * *
“To make out a successful Brady claim, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material” … . In New York, where a defendant made a specific discovery request for a document, and the information was not disclosed, we measure the third prong of the materiality of the suppressed Brady material by considering whether there is a reasonable possibility that disclosure of the evidence would have changed the result of the proceedings … . In the absence of a specific request by defendant, materiality is established if there is a “reasonable probability” that the result would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed — meaning ” a probability sufficient to undermine the court’s confidence in the outcome of the trial’ ” … . * * *
In determining that a Brady violation occurred, the Appellate Division failed to do the required materiality analysis as to the suppressed information. * * *
… [T]o say that there was ample impeachment evidence at trial against the witness on multiple levels is an understatement. … [T]here is no reasonable possibility that the knowledge that the trial prosecutor was the specific ADA who stood up for the People at the June 13th appearance and that JA was still in a drug program despite additional program violations — leaving treatment and bringing cigarettes into a facility — would have changed the jury’s verdict. People v Giuca, 2019 NY Slip Op 04642, CtApp 6-11-19