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LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION, PREMISED ON DEFENDANT’S AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE OR CONTROL THE PERFORMANCE OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s Labor Law 200 cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff was injured when he was attempting to move a light fixture. He was cutting sheetrock in the ceiling with an allegedly improper electric saw when it kicked back and injured him. The Labor Law 240 and 231 causes of action were properly dismissed because an elevation-related hazard was not alleged, nor was an Industrial Code violation:

“Where a plaintiff’s claims implicate the means and methods of the work, an owner or contractor will not be held liable under Labor Law § 200 unless it had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work. General supervisory authority to oversee the progress of the work is insufficient to impose liability. A defendant has the authority to control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed” … .

Here, as supplemented by the plaintiff’s affidavit, the complaint states cognizable causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 200 and to recover damages for common-law negligence. The plaintiff averred that on the day of the accident, Rapaport [the construction manager] , whom he knew as the “contractor,” directed the plaintiff to move an overhead light from one place in the ceiling to another and told him to use an electrical saw to cut the sheetrock in the ceiling. These allegations are sufficient to support the statutory and common-law negligence claims against the moving defendants, and the moving defendants’ documentary evidence does not utterly refute these allegations … . Soller v Dahan, 2019 NY Slip Op 04441, Second Dept 6-5-19

 

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION, AN ADMINISTRATIVE... THE GYM TEACHER TOLD THE STUDENTS TO RUN AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE BUILDING;...