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PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT PROOF IT HAD THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO CLOSE ON THE PURCHASE OF REAL PROPERTY, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this action for specific performance of a real estate purchase agreement should not have been granted. Plaintiff did not submit proof it had the financial ability to close:

“A plaintiff seeking specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property bears the burden of demonstrating that he or she was ready, willing, and able to perform his or her obligations under the contract” … . “[C]onclusory assertions that the plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform, are insufficient to satisfy this burden” … .

“When a purchaser submits no documentation or other proof to substantiate that it had the funds necessary to purchase the property, it cannot prove, as a matter of law, that it was ready, willing, and able to close” … . Thus, in moving for summary judgment on a complaint seeking specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, a plaintiff purchaser must submit evidence demonstrating its financial ability to purchase the property, and in the absence of such evidence, the motion must be denied … .

Here, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it was ready, willing, and able to purchase the subject property. More specifically, the conclusory assertions of Gavriel Yakubov, the alleged sole member of the plaintiff, that he had always been, and remained, ready, willing, and able to close, absent any evidence demonstrating the plaintiff’s financial ability to close, were insufficient to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to purchase the subject property … . GLND 1945, LLC v Ballard, 2019 NY Slip Op 04143, Second Dept 5-29-19

 

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