You are here: / / THE PURPORTED WAIVER OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE WAS NOT IN WRITING...
,

THE PURPORTED WAIVER OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE WAS NOT IN WRITING AS REQUIRED BY GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 17-103, PLAINTIFF’S BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION IS TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman, determined that, because the defendant’s (CFA’s) purported waiver of the statute of limitations defense was not in writing as required by General Obligations Law 17-103, plaintiff’s breach of contract action was time-barred:

To govern the … “subtle interplay . . . between the freedom to contract and New York public policy” … , the legislature enacted General Obligations Law § 17-103 (“Agreements waiving the statute of limitation”), the first paragraph of which provides:

“A promise to waive, to extend, or not to plead the statute of limitation applicable to an action arising out of a contract express or implied in fact or in law, if made after the accrual of the cause of action and made, either with or without consideration, in a writing signed by the promisor or his agent is effective, according to its terms, to prevent interposition of the defense of the statute of limitation in an action or proceeding commenced within the time that would be applicable if the cause of action had arisen at the date of the promise, or within such shorter time as may be provided in the promise” (General Obligations Law § 17-103[1] … ).

“An agreement to extend the statute of limitations that does not comply with these requirements [of § 17-103(1)] has no effect'” … . Sotheby’s, Inc. v Mao, 2019 NY Slip Op 03477, First Dept 5-2-18

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF FELL DOWN AN OPEN, UNGUARDED MANHOLE AS HE ATTEMPTED TO STEP OVER IT; PLAINTIFF’S ACTION WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PROTECTIVE RAILING AROUND THE MANHOLE (FIRST DEPT). ​
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ATTACH HIMSELF TO AN AVAILABLE LIFELINE, QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
DATE OF WOMAN’S DISAPPEARANCE, NOT THE STATUTORY DEFAULT DATE FIVE YEARS LATER, WAS THE CORRECT DATE OF DEATH (FIRST DEPT).
PETITIONER SOUGHT RECORDS FROM THE NYC TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION (TLC) TO DETERMINE HOW THE COMMISSION WAS HANDLING LICENSE APPLICANTS WITH CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS; THE REQUEST SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED; MATTER REMITTED FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW (FIRST DEPT).
Third-Party Claims Against Other Law Firms Which Advised Plaintiff.
7/8 INCH HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE FLOOR AND DOORWAY THRESHOLD WAS DEEMED TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; THE NYC BUILDING CODE, WHICH REQUIRES A HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL OF NO MORE THAN 1/2 INCH, DID NOT APPLY TO THE HOME PURCHASED IN 1980 (FIRST DEPT).
LOSS OF RESTAURANT CUSTOMERS DUE TO COVID DOES NOT CONSTITUTE “DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OR DAMAGE” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE BUSINESS-INTERRUPTION INSURANCE POLICY (FIRST DEPT).
WRONGFUL DEATH PROCEEDS BELONG TO THE DISTRIBUTEES, NOT THE ESTATE; THEREFORE, RATHER THAN DIVIDING THE PROCEEDS EQUALLY, SURROGATE’S COURT MUST CONDUCT A HEARING AND DISPURSE THE PROCEEDS BASED UPON PECUNIARY LOSS (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FALL FROM A FOLDED, UNSECURED A-FRAME LADDER AFTER PLAINTIFF RECEIVED AN ELECTRIC... THE COURT DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT PROCURED BY THE...