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THE PURPORTED WAIVER OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE WAS NOT IN WRITING AS REQUIRED BY GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 17-103, PLAINTIFF’S BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION IS TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman, determined that, because the defendant’s (CFA’s) purported waiver of the statute of limitations defense was not in writing as required by General Obligations Law 17-103, plaintiff’s breach of contract action was time-barred:

To govern the … “subtle interplay . . . between the freedom to contract and New York public policy” … , the legislature enacted General Obligations Law § 17-103 (“Agreements waiving the statute of limitation”), the first paragraph of which provides:

“A promise to waive, to extend, or not to plead the statute of limitation applicable to an action arising out of a contract express or implied in fact or in law, if made after the accrual of the cause of action and made, either with or without consideration, in a writing signed by the promisor or his agent is effective, according to its terms, to prevent interposition of the defense of the statute of limitation in an action or proceeding commenced within the time that would be applicable if the cause of action had arisen at the date of the promise, or within such shorter time as may be provided in the promise” (General Obligations Law § 17-103[1] … ).

“An agreement to extend the statute of limitations that does not comply with these requirements [of § 17-103(1)] has no effect'” … . Sotheby’s, Inc. v Mao, 2019 NY Slip Op 03477, First Dept 5-2-18

 

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