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DEFENDANT’S HEALTH AT THE TIME OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS NEVER PLACED IN CONTROVERSY AND THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE WAS NOT WAIVED BY A LETTER TO PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY INDICATING DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM DEMENTIA, ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that defendant driver’s (Rozansky’s) medical condition at the time of this 2004 traffic accident was not “in controversy” and therefore the driver’s medical records were not discoverable. Rozansky, who subsequently died, had, in 2006, submitted a letter from his social worker to plaintiff’s attorney claiming he suffered from dementia, anxiety and depression, allegedly to be excused from a deposition, but otherwise the issue of the Rozansky’s health was not raised:

… [T]he plaintiffs failed to sustain their initial burden of demonstrating that Rozansky’s condition at the time of the accident was “in controversy” within the meaning of CPLR 3121(a) … . Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs had met that burden, neither Rozansky nor his estate waived the privilege attached to the medical records, as the defendant has not asserted a counterclaim or sought to excuse Rozansky’s conduct at the time of the accident on the basis of some condition … . Contrary to the conclusion of our dissenting colleagues, Rozansky did not place his mental condition at the time of the accident “in controversy” or waive the privilege attached to his medical records by allegedly declining to be deposed … . Neither Rozansky nor his estate have sought to excuse his conduct at the time of the accident … , due to any condition. At best, Rozansky placed his mental condition in September 2006 at issue by allegedly refusing to appear for a deposition … . The plaintiffs could have moved at that time to compel the deposition and challenged the social worker’s diagnosis. Instead, nine years after the social worker’s letter, and six years after Rozansky’s death, and after filing three notes of issue over the course of some seven years, indicating that discovery was complete and the case was ready for trial, the plaintiffs purported to use the mechanism of a trial subpoena to compel production of Rozansky’s medical records from October 22, 1999, to the present. We disagree with our dissenting colleagues that Rozansky’s alleged invocation of dementia in September 2006, by submission of a letter from his social worker, established a waiver of the privilege attached to his medical records from October 22, 1999. Peterson v Estate of John Rozansky, 2019 NY Slip Op 02568, Second Department, 4-3-19

 

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