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DEFENDANT’S SLOW MOVING TRUCK FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION BUT WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION, DIFFICULTY SEEING BECAUSE OF SUNLIGHT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A NON-NEGLIGENT EXCUSE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted in this traffic-accident case:

In this rear-end collision case, the fact that the truck owned and operated by defendants had entered onto the parkway one exit earlier than authorized by a permit issued by the Department of Transportation, standing alone, does not establish that the early entry onto the parkway was a proximate cause of the accident … . The record reflects that the accident occurred on a dry and sunny day with light traffic, that defendant Paolino was driving the truck slowly, and that Paolino had turned on the truck’s hazard lights. The truck’s presence on the parkway merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the accident, but not its cause … .

Plaintiffs’ proffered excuse for the accident, that the bright sunlight may have made it difficult for the decedent to see defendants’ truck driving through the tunnel, does not constitute a nonnegligent explanation for the rear-end collusion … . The affidavit by plaintiffs’ accident reconstruction expert is not based on any evidence and therefore fails to raise an issue of fact … . Battocchio v Paolino, 2019 NY Slip Op 02477, First Dept 4-2-19

 

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