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THE 30-DAY NOTICE PROVISION IN THE MORTGAGE DID NOT PRECLUDE ACCELERATING THE DEBT BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE NULLIFIED THE ACCELERATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have nullified the acceleration of the mortgage in this foreclosure action. Because acceleration was optional, the 30-day notice provision in the mortgage did not preclude acceleration by the allegations in the foreclosure complaint:

Supreme Court erred in nullifying plaintiff’s assignor’s acceleration in the prior action based on Section 22 of the mortgage which provides that the lender may accelerate the mortgage only if, inter alia, it has served defendant with a proper 30-day notice of default. Where the acceleration is optional as here, some affirmative action must be taken to evince the note holder’s election to accelerate … . Affirmative action can be in the form of a letter … or the commencement of a foreclosure action … . Plaintiff’s assignor accelerated the mortgage debt by commencing the prior action and stating in its complaint that “plaintiff elects herein to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage(s).” Capital One, N.A. v Saglimbeni, 2019 NY Slip Op 01837, First Dept 3-14-19

 

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