DEFENDANT SOLE SHAREHOLDER OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ACTION AGAINST HIM PREMISED UPON PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE WARRANTY PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT WERE VIOLATED AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS STRIPPED OF ASSETS SUCH THAT IT COULD NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, over a partial dissent, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that defendant Brookstein, the sole shareholder of corporate defendant DKM, was not entitled to summary judgment in the action against him based upon piercing the corporate veil:
“The general rule, of course, is that a corporation exists independently of its owners, who are not personally liable for its obligations, and that individuals may incorporate for the express purpose of limiting their liability… . The concept of piercing the corporate veil is an exception to this general rule, permitting, in certain circumstances, the imposition of personal liability on owners for the obligations of their corporation … . A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must demonstrate that a court in equity should intervene because the owners of the corporation exercised complete domination over [the corporation] in the transaction at issue and, in doing so, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, thereby perpetrating a wrong that resulted in injury to the plaintiff … .
A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil bears a heavy burden… . “Veil-piercing is a fact-laden claim that is not well suited for summary judgment resolution” … .
Here, Brookstein did not establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. It is undisputed that Brookstein dissolved DKM without making any reserves for contingent liabilities, despite the existence of a provision in the contract of sale pursuant to which DKM agreed to indemnify [plaintiff] for any breach of warranty for a period of 7½ years after the closing of the sale. This factor was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Brookstein stripped the corporation of assets, leaving DKM without sufficient funds to pay its contractual contingent liabilities … . Town-Line Car Wash, Inc. v Don’s Kleen Mach. Kar Wash, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 01443, Second Dept 2-27-19
